Normal default logic (NDL) and semi-normal default logic (SNDL) are syntactically restricted variants of Reiter's default logic (DL). Although semi-normal defaults have only a slightly more general form than normal defaults, SNDL does not share the nice properties of NDL (e.g., semimonotonicity). In this note, we address the effect of semi-normality on the expressive power of defaults, using a classification method based on polynomial, faithful, and modular (PFM) translation functions. The resulting classification indicates that SNDL and DL are of equal expressive power, which strictly exceeds that of NDL. This strengthens an earlier result achieved by Marek and Truszczyński, who establish the equivalence of weak semi-normal defaults with general defaults. Furthermore, it is established that prerequisite-free fragments of DL and SNDL (PDL and PSNDL) are of equal expressive power. Consequently, PSNDL is less expressive than DL and SNDL, incomparable with NDL, and more expressive than preferential entailment (a generalized form of circumscription). The latter result is in sharp contrast with Imielinski's result, which states that prerequisite-free and semi-normal default theories can be modularly translated into preferential entailment.
Introduction
Reiter's default logic (DL) [29] is one of the major formalizations of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) and has important applications in artificial intelligence, such as planning [3] , diagnosis [30] , and product configuration [33] .
The relationships between DL and other non-monotonic logics have been extensively studied [1, 4, 8, [10] [11] [12] 17, 18, [21] [22] [23] 28, 32, 34] . The basic approach in this line of research is establishing semantics-preserving translations between non-monotonic logics. A systematic analysis is performed in [16] , where polynomial, faithful, and modular (PFM) translations are distinguished as the measure for comparing the expressive powers of nonmonotonic logics. As a result, six different non-monotonic logics from [19, [22] [23] [24] 26, 29, 35] are ordered to form an expressive power hierarchy (EPH), as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Reiter's DL has a prominent role in EPH as it resides in the (so far) most expressive class. The current EPH [16] also covers syntactically restricted variants of DL: normal DL (NDL) and prerequisite-free DL (PDL), as well as their hybrid (PNDL). All of these reside strictly below DL in EPH, which indicates that syntactic restrictions tend to decrease the expressiveness of defaults as expected.
The theories of NDL are appealing, as they possess interesting properties in contrast to general default theories [29] ; the existence of an extension is guaranteed and defaults can be applied in a semi-monotonic fashion. However, Reiter and Criscuolo [31] note that in practice normal defaults are insufficient to handle interactions among defaults properly. As a remedy, they introduce semi-normal defaults that are of slightly more general form and enable refined control over the applicability of defaults. Unfortunately, semi-normal DL (SNDL) does not enjoy the nice properties of NDL [31] . This observation suggests that the expressive power of SNDL exceeds that of NDL to some extent. However, earlier results [9, 10, 20, 23, 31] on SNDL leave the exact relationship of SNDL to other non-monotonic logics open.
In this note, we evaluate the effect of semi-normality on the expressiveness of defaults. Technically speaking, we apply the classification method based on PFM translations [16] in order to compare the expressive power of SNDL with that of DL and NDL (note from Fig. 1 that DL and NDL reside in different classes of EPH). For the sake of comprehensiveness, a similar comparison is performed for the prerequisite-free variants of the three logics (PDL, PNDL, and PSNDL). The remaining sections of this note are composed as follows. The basic notions of Reiter's DL [29] (including its various syntactically restricted forms) are reviewed in Section 2. The classification method based on PFM translations and the current EPH [16] is presented in Section 3. The actual expressiveness analysis takes place in Section 4 (long proofs have been moved to Appendix A). As the main results of this note, it is established that (i) DL and SNDL, and (ii) PDL and PSNDL, are of equal expressive power. A comparison of these results with related work is performed in Section 5. In particular, the first result strengthens another, achieved by Marek and Truszczyński [23] , who establish the equivalence of DL and a variant of SNDL. Moreover, the latter result implies that PSNDL cannot be modularly translated into preferential entailment (a generalization of McCarthy's circumscription), which contradicts a result achieved by Imielinski [10] . Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Syntactic variants of Reiter's default logic
We begin with a short introduction to Reiter's default logic [29] in the propositional case. We are assuming that the reader is familiar with the basic syntactic and semantic notions of classical propositional logic (CL). To fix some notation, we let L stand for a propositional language and we write L(A) to declare that L is based on a (at most countable) set of propositional atoms A. Then given any theory T ⊆ L, the closure of T under propositional consequence is Cn(T ) = {φ ∈ L | T |= φ}. Moreover, we write T φ to mean that a sentence φ ∈ L is propositionally consistent with a theory T ⊆ L, i.e., when the theory T ∪ {φ} is propositionally consistent. Then T expresses the fact that a theory T ⊆ L is propositionally consistent, i.e., T |= ⊥. 1 A default theory in a propositional language L is a pair D, T where T ⊆ L and D is a set of default rules (or defaults) of the form
such that n 0 and the prerequisite α, the justifications β 1 , . . . , β n , and the consequent γ of the rule are sentences of L. The intuition behind a rule (1) is that γ can be inferred whenever α is inferable and each justification β i can be consistently assumed. Given a set of defaults D, we let Jf(D) and Cq(D) stand for the sets of justifications and consequents that appear in D, respectively. Let us now turn our attention to the semantics of defaults. Following an idea propounded by Marek and Truszczyński [23] , we reduce a set of defaults D to a set of ordinary inference rules by interpreting the justifications with respect to a propositional theory E ⊆ L. The reduct 2 D E contains an inference rule α γ whenever there is a default (1) such that E β i holds for all 0 < i n. Given T ⊆ L and a set of inference rules R in L, the closure 1 The propositional constants and ⊥ stand for truth and falsity, respectively. 2 This is analogous to the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct of normal logic programs [7] , but rephrased for default theories rather than normal logic programs.
Cn
R (T ) of T under R and propositional consequence can be defined as the least theory of inference rules from R such that T ∪ {γ 1 , . . . , γ n } |= φ and T ∪ {γ 1 , . . . , γ i−1 } |= α i holds for each 0 < i n. Reiter [29] defines the semantics of a default theory D, T by associating a set of extensions E ⊆ L with D, T . However, rather than presenting Reiter's original quasi-inductive definition of extensions, we resort to an alternative definition [23] , given below as Definition 1. The number of extensions possessed by a default theory D, T may vary in general. In the sequel, default logic (DL) is the non-monotonic logic based on default theories under Reiter's extensions. For more details and insights on DL, we suggest Reiter's classic articles [29, 31] , as well as books on default reasoning and NMR in general [2, 5, 6, 23] . [23] 
Definition 1 (Marek and Truszczyński
Normality and semi-normality (see, e.g., [31] ) are examples of syntactic constraints imposed on defaults of the general form (1) . A normal default is of the form α:γ γ which corresponds to stipulating n = 1 and β 1 = γ in (1) . Thus the consistency of the consequent γ is tested before the default is applied. This implies that a propositional contradiction cannot be derived using normal defaults. A default theory D, T is normal if D contains only normal defaults. The fragment of DL corresponding to normal default theories under Reiter's extensions is called normal DL (NDL). A semi-normal default is of a slightly more general form α:γ ∧β γ , which incorporates a refined justification γ ∧ β compared to plain γ in the normal case. Semi-normal default theories and semi-normal DL (SNDL) are defined analogously to normal default theories and NDL. Yet another syntactic restriction concerns prerequisites: a default (1) 
Classification method and expressive power hierarchy
In this section, we review our method [16] for classifying non-monotonic logics on the basis of their expressive powers. Let us start by introducing some common notation and definitions for non-monotonic logics in the propositional case. In general, a non-monotonic theory is a pair X, T where T ⊆ L is a propositional subtheory and X is any set(s) of syntactic elements which is/are specific to the non-monotonic logic L in question (such as a set of default rules D in Reiter's DL). A non-monotonic logic L is identified as a set of finite non-monotonic theories in definitions to come. In analogy to DL, the semantics of a non-monotonic theory X, T is determined by the extensions of X, T , i.e., the sets of conclusions E ⊆ L associated with X, T . Finally, we let X, T denote the length of a non-monotonic theory X, T which is the number of symbol occurrences needed to represent the theory X, T in terms of symbols. Our requirements for translation functions are as follows. Let us brief our justifications for the three requirements. 4 The polynomiality condition bounds the time as well as space needed for computing a translation. The aim of the faithfulness condition is to preserve the semantics of a non-monotonic theory X, T to a reasonable degree. In contrast to other approaches, such as [8, 23] , we ignore propositionally inconsistent extensions. This is because inconsistent extensions behave differently in different non-monotonic logics and ignoring them has turned out to be essential in order to establish translations in certain cases. For instance, an inconsistent extension excludes others in DL but not in Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) [26] . Then a one-to-one correspondence of extensions, so that extensions coincide up to L, is impossible unless inconsistent extensions are ignored [11] . This aspect of Definition 2 is also critical regarding the faithfulness of the translation function Tr SN presented in this note. It is also worth pointing out that our notion of faithfulness supports cautious reasoning with extensions, i.e., their intersection is of interest, but brave reasoning is preserved as far as propositionally consistent extensions are considered. Moreover, our condition admits a further degree of freedom, as it permits translation functions to introduce new propositional atoms. This option is already present in the notion of semi-representability proposed by Marek and Truszczyński [23] and it plays a crucial role when embedding DL into Marek and Truszczyński's strong autoepistemic logic (SAEL) [11] . Finally, the modularity condition obliges the translation of X to be independent of T and thus unaffected by any changes made to T . Our condition is a generalization of the one imposed by Gottlob [8] on specific translation functions from DL to AEL. It is important to note that many translation functions are modular in a much stronger sense, e.g., the parameters in X can be translated independently of each other. Put more formally, the translation function Tr satisfies Tr(X ∪ Y ) = Tr(X) ∪ Tr(Y ) for any sets of parameters X and Y . However, the Table 1 Relations among non-monotonic logics
current condition is justifiable to retain the strength of our intranslatability theorems [16] , which establish the fact that a (modular) translation function is impossible in certain cases. For the sake of brevity, a translation function Tr : L 1 → L 2 is called PFM if it is polynomial, faithful, and modular simultaneously. In particular, we note that any composition of PFM translation functions is also PFM [16] . PFM translation functions provide us with a framework for analyzing the relative expressive power of non-monotonic logics. The idea behind this is that if there is a PFM translation function that maps the theories of one non-monotonic logic L 1 to the theories of another non-monotonic logic L 2 , then we consider L 2 to be at least as expressive as
This gives rise to a preorder (i.e., a reflexive and transitive relation) on the class of nonmonotonic logics. In certain cases, we are able to discover a counter-example to establish that L 1 →L 2 , i.e., there is no PFM translation function from L 1 to L 2 . The relations → and → form the basic building blocks of the more complex relations listed in Table 1 . Note that the relation ⇒ is a strict partial order on the equivalence classes induced by → .
In [16] , these relations are used as the basis for a systematic comparison of the expressive powers of non-monotonic logics. As a result of the analysis, the expressive power hierarchy (EPH) of non-monotonic logics is obtained. The current EPH is illustrated in Fig. 1 . There are five different equivalence classes, each of which is explained below.
(1) The topmost class in Fig. 1 contains the most expressive non-monotonic logics, namely DL and Marek and Truszczyński's strong autoepistemic logic (SAEL) [22] , as well as Wang et al.'s priority logic (PL) [35] . (2) Below this class, on the right-hand side, there is a class with less expressive nonmonotonic logics, including Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) [26] , PDL, and weak default logic (WDL) [23] , which is based on a weaker notion of extensions than the one given in Definition 1. (3) On the left-hand side, we have a class containing NDL which is incomparable with the previous class. In [16] this is proved to be caused by two factors: (i) some inference rules in NDL (and DL) cannot be properly grasped by the logics in the previous class, and (ii) the existence of extensions is guaranteed in NDL, while not in the logics of the previous class. (4) Below these two classes, there is a less expressive class containing Lifschitz' parallel circumscription (CIRC) [19] , as well as PNDL. (5) Classical propositional logic (CL) resides at the bottom of the hierarchy to make our view complete. Any propositional theory T can be viewed as a parameterless nonmonotonic theory with a unique extension Cn(T ).
In contrast with earlier results on expressiveness [1, 8] , the classes of EPH indicate that AEL and PDL are of equal expressive power and less expressive than DL and SAEL. However, the differing views can be understood by the criteria imposed on translation functions [16] . It is also worth pointing out that every class of current EPH can be characterized by a syntactic variant of DL: (unrestricted) DL, NDL, PDL, PNDL, and CL (i.e., DL without defaults). The structure of EPH indicates that syntactic restrictions on defaults tend to decrease the expressive power of the resulting variants of DL. The above considerations motivate the use of PFM translation functions, as well as EPH, for investigating the effect of semi-normality on the expressiveness of defaults.
Expressiveness analysis
As explained in Section 3, the expressive powers of PDL, NDL, and PNDL have already been analyzed [16] . In this section, we perform a similar analysis for SNDL and PSNDL in order to locate their exact positions in EPH. We start by showing how the current EPH provides lower and upper bounds for the expressiveness of SNDL (recall the structure of EPH from Fig. 1 ). There is a significant difference between NDL and SNDL: a normal default theory has always at least one extension [23, p. 107 ], but this is not guaranteed for semi-normal default theories in general. Probably the simplest counter-example [31] } containing three circularly interdependent defaults so that no extension is established for D, ∅ . In the sequel, we shall use D as a primitive for excluding extensions. In order to control such a primitive, we extend D with three additional defaults in Example 4. Roughly speaking, the idea is to activate the defaults of D and thus prevent the realization of extensions only when f is present. We have carefully chosen the additional defaults so as to be both semi-normal and prerequisite-free, so that the resulting primitive is applicable within SNDL as well as PSNDL.
Example 4. Consider a semi-normal and prerequisite-free set of defaults
and any default theory D, T in L(A) such that A ∩ {p, q, r, f} = ∅. Then it holds for any E ⊆ L that E is an extension of D, T if and only if Cn(E ∪ {p, q, r}) is an extension of D ∪ C, T . Moreover, the default theory D ∪ C, T ∪ {f} has no extensions.
The set of defaults C introduced in Example 4 may then be used to establish that NDL ⇒ SNDL, i.e., NDL is strictly less expressive than SNDL. ∈ D, we define
For a default theory D, T , we define is not applicable when the justifications β 1 , . . . , β n are consistent, but the consequent γ is not. To relax this problem, we have to introduce the rules of C as well as a semi-normal default
. This is to detect cases where d would be applicable in principle, but γ is not derivable by
, as γ is inconsistent. In this case, the atom f is derived in order to ensure that no extension can result. It is demonstrated by the following example how the set of defaults C is exploited in practice to handle cases where a propositionally inconsistent extension would arise. ∈ D such that E ∦ β i for some β i . For every propositionally closed theory E ⊆ L , define Ext(E ) = E ∩ L.
Definition 8. Let D, T be a default theory in L(A),
A = {c φ | φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪ Cq(D)} ∪ {b d | d ∈ D} ∪ {f, p, q,
Proposition 9. Let D, T be a default theory in L.
(
1) If E ⊆ L is a propositionally consistent extension of D, T , then E = Ext SN (E) is a propositionally consistent extension of Tr SN ( D, T ). (2) If E is a propositionally consistent extension of Tr SN ( D, T ), then E = Ext(E ) is a propositionally consistent extension of D, T . (3) The propositionally consistent extensions of D, T and Tr SN ( D, T ) are in a one-toone correspondence and coincide up to L.
Proof. The detailed proofs of the claims (1)-(3) appear in Appendix A.
The main result of this note is formulated as Theorem 10, which implies, together with Proposition 3, that DL and SNDL are of equal expressive power and thus located in the same class of EPH.
Theorem 10. DL → SNDL.
Proof. It is obvious that Tr SN is both polynomial and modular, while the faithfulness of Tr SN follows as a result of Proposition 9. ✷ An analogous result follows immediately for PDL and PSNDL. This is because Tr SN ( D, T ) is both prerequisite-free and semi-normal, provided that D, T is prerequisite-free. This property can easily be inspected from Definition 6. Consequently, PDL and PSNDL reside in the same class of EPH. Theorem 11. PDL → PSNDL.
Related work
In this section, we address earlier work on translating normal and semi-normal defaults [9, 10, 20, 23] . Let us proceed in a chronological order. In an early paper [9] , Grosof analyses the possibilities of embedding default logic into circumscription. His idea is to translate a normal default α:β β into formula circumscription [25] by setting α ∧ ¬β subject to minimization while the truth value of β may vary freely. However, Grosof's idea cannot lead to a faithful translation in the sense explained in Section 3. This is because (i) Grosof's translation is polynomial and modular, (ii) by [25] formula circumscription can be captured by ordinary circumscription [24] and thus also by CIRC, and (iii) the classes of EPH indicate that CIRC ⇒ NDL. In fact, Imielinski [10, Theorem 3.1] provides a concrete counter-example which implies NDL →CIRC and which applies to Grosof's translation, too. Etherington [5, p. 150 ] equates Grosof's principle with a prerequisite-free and normal default :α→β α→β (note that falsifying α ∧ ¬β corresponds to setting α → β true). This interpretation leads to identical conclusions, as NDL →PNDL holds by the classes of EPH.
From a historical perspective, it is also worth mentioning an article [20] and then into a normal default α:γ ∧β γ ∧β . By Theorem 10, the objective of the first step is realistic, but Łukaszewicz does not provide a consistency checking mechanism to deal with inconsistent consequents γ . Therefore, the set of defaults in Example 7 is not faithfully captured by his translation. More generally, the second translation considered by Łukaszewicz cannot be faithful according to the result SNDL →NDL of Theorem 5.
Imielinski [10] presents results on a generalization of circumscription: the models M ⊆ A for a propositional language L(A) may be ordered by an arbitrary preorder (reflexive and transitive relation) . Note that various forms of circumscription [19, 24, 25] correspond to specific preorders among models. Given T 1 = {p, q ↔ ¬r}, the default theory D, T 1 has a unique extension E 1 = Cn({p, q, ¬r}). Note that T 1 has two models M 1 = {p, q} and M 2 = {p, r}. Since ¬r ∈ E 1 and D is modularly representable by with an abnormality theory A = ∅, it follows that T 1 |= ¬r. Thus r must be false in all -minimal models of T 1 implying that M 1 < M 2 must hold.
Then it follows by symmetry that M 3 < M 1 must hold for the models M 1 and M 3 = {q, r} of T 2 = {q, r ↔ ¬p}. Similarly, M 2 < M 3 must hold for the models M 2 and M 3 of justifications β 1 , . . . , β n are very similar to ours, except that α appears as a prerequisite. The last default controls the derivation of the consequent γ of the original rule, but this is not a semi-normal default. Marek and Truszczyński establish that Tr MT is PFM so that DL ↔ WSNDL. However, this does not imply that DL ↔ SNDL, since weak semi-normal theories have a richer syntax, so that SNDL → WSNDL holds. Thus, in order to establish SNDL ↔ WSNDL, we should express justification-free defaults in terms of semi-normal defaults. To achieve this, we may apply the translational technique of Definition 6: a justification-free default together with the set of defaults C given in (2).
Conclusions
In this note, we apply a framework [16] based on polynomial, faithful, and modular (PFM) translation functions for analyzing the expressive powers of two semi-normal variants of Reiter's default logic (DL). A non-trivial PFM translation function Tr SN is devised in order to establish the main results of this note: DL and semi-normal DL (SNDL) are shown to be of equal expressive power by Theorem 10, and the same holds true for prerequisite-free DL (PDL) and prerequisite-free SNDL (PSNDL), as shown by Theorem 11. Therefore, we conclude that semi-normality does not affect the expressive power of defaults according to the measure of expressiveness based on PFM translations. In contrast to this, normality-although very close to semi-normality-decreases the expressiveness of defaults, as normal DL (NDL) and prerequisite-free NDL (PNDL) are less expressive than DL and PDL, respectively.
The results presented in Section 4 lead to new interpretations regarding the expressive powers of semi-normal variants of DL. In contrast to a result achieved by Imielinski [10, Lemma 3.2], the expressive power of PSNDL exceeds that of preferential entailment (which includes various forms of circumscription). Moreover, the result that DL and SNDL are of equal expressive power strengthens Marek and Truszczyński's corresponding result [23, Theorem 5.19] for weak SNDL (WSNDL). Theorem 10 also implies that an arbitrary default can be translated into defaults with exactly one justification, i.e., n = 1 holds in (1). This tightens Marek and Truszczyński's result that unitary defaults with 0 n 1 are sufficient to express all defaults [23, Corollary 5.20] . Finally, we remind the reader that Reiter's original definition of a default (1) required that n > 0. However, in harmony with [23] we are ready to accept justification-free defaults with n = 0. Theorem 10 indicates that this distinction is not significant: the expressive power of DL is not affected by this choice.
Appendix A. Proofs
The first of our two lemmas summarizes the effects on propositional reasoning when a set of new literals L is added to a propositional theory T .
Lemma A.1. Let T ⊆ L(A) be a propositional theory and L a set of literals based on a set of atoms
Let φ ∈ L be any sentence and l any literal based on A .
In the forthcoming lemma and the proof of Proposition 9, we are assuming the following common definitions: D, T is a default theory in L(A), A is the set of atoms from Definition 8, C is the set of defaults from Example 4, and D ∪ C, T is the translation
The reduct of D ∪ C with respect to a candidate extension E is precomputed as follows.
Lemma A.2. If E ⊆ L(A) is a propositionally consistent and closed theory and
Proof.
by (1) 
(R5) The justification of
Similarly, the justification of
The other two equivalences involving p, q, r, and f follow by symmetry. ✷ Proof of (1) 
It remains to establish
Base case: k = 0. Then T |= φ holds for φ ∈ L. It follows that φ ∈ F , since T ⊆ F and F is closed under propositional consequence.
Induction step. Suppose that φ ∈ L is D E -provable from T in k steps, i.e., there is a sequence of rules 
∈ A by the definition of A. In addition, E γ i holds, as γ i ∈ E and E . Thus {
To conclude, we note that
Then we obtain by (R2) that c β i / ∈ A for some justification
, and A trivially, we obtain E |= α by (2) 
Base case: k = 0, i.e., T |= φ holds for φ ∈ L. Because T ⊆ F and F is propositionally closed, we obtain φ ∈ F .
there is a sequence ∈ D E . Moreover, the prerequisite α i ∈ L is (D ∪ C) E -provable from T in less than k steps. Thus α i ∈ F by the inductive hypothesis, and γ i ∈ F , as F is closed under the rules of D E . Thus we have that T ∪ {γ 1 , . . . , γ l } ⊆ F . This implies φ ∈ F , as T ∪ {γ 1 , . . . , γ l } |= φ and F is propositionally closed.
(E ⊇ F ) It is established that E shares the closure properties of F .
(1) Since T ⊆ L and T ⊆ E = Cn (D ∪C) E (T ), it follows that T ⊆ E = E ∩ L. (2) Suppose that φ ∈ L belongs to Cn(E). Since E = Cn(E ) and E ⊆ E , it follows that φ ∈ E so that φ ∈ E. Ext(E 1 ) = Ext(E 2 ). It follows that E 1 ∩ L = E 2 ∩ L = E and E . Then consider any i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows by the proof of (2) in Proposition 9 that E i = Cn(E i ∪ A i ) where E i = E i ∩ L and A i = E i ∩ A such that f / ∈ A i . Thus E i = Cn(E ∪ A i ). Let us now establish step by step that A 1 = A 2 . 
